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FOREWORD 
Jeffrey Rosen* 
America now is a society addicted to legalism that has lost its 
faith in legal argument. The impeachment of Bill Clinton was only 
the most visible manifestation of this paradox. Both Democrats 
and Republicans professed a rhetorical commitment to the rule of 
law while revealing a deep pessimism about the ability of courts, 
legislatures, or even citizens to transcend their biases and to con­
verge, through deliberation, on impartial and democratically ac­
ceptable outcomes. The simplistic Supreme Court decisions that 
precipitated the impeachment - in particular, Morrison v. Olson,1 
upholding the Independent Counsel law, and Jones v. Clinton,2 de­
nying the President temporary immunity from civil suits while in 
office - were based on the principle that the President should not 
be above the law, a principle repeatedly invoked by both parties in 
the House and the Senate; but the content of the congressional de­
liberations revealed an unsettling cynicism about the malleability of 
legal argument. Both sides embraced interpretive methodologies 
that they had rejected on previous occasions, as the President's ac­
cusers praised the virtues of a living Constitution while the Presi­
dent's defenders insisted on the importance of original 
understanding. Perhaps most jarringly, after declining to engage 
each other's arguments, the two parties in the House and Senate 
divided more or less along party lines. The partisan character of the 
votes on the articles of impeachment seemed to reinforce the parti­
san character of law itself. 
There is nothing new, of course, about the insight that judges 
and jurors sometimes find it hard to transcend their own biases, and 
that courts should hesitate, for this reason, to usurp the decisions of 
the democratically accountable political branches. This has been 
the refrain of political and academic critics of the Warren Court 
ever since the 1950s, and it has now transformed our legal culture. 
But then something odd happened. At the very moment that 
* Associate Professor, The George Washington University Law School. A.B. 1986, 
Harvard; B.A. 1988, Oxford, U.K.; J.D. 1991, Yale. Portions of this essay appeared in a 
different form in the New Republic. - Ed. 
1. 487 U. S. 654 (1988). 
2. 520 U. S. 681 (1998). 
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judges began to agree about the virtues of deference to the political 
branches, legal scholars began to wonder whether the political 
branches deserved all that much deference after all. Public choice 
theory called into question the claim that self-interested legislators 
were well-equipped to reflect the will of the majority. The New 
Chicago School of Social Norms pointed to the ways that norms can 
influence behavior more effectively than law can, and ways that 
norms and law can influence each other, sometimes in perverse 
ways. Critical race and feminist theories insisted that objective 
truth is unknowable because we are all prisoners of racially, sexu­
ally, and economically determined perspectives that can never be 
transcended through reasoned deliberation. (And contemporary 
pragmatists added to the rampantly subjectivist atmosphere.) And 
an explosion of federal lawmaking during the past decade raised 
questions about whether Congress deserved deference because of 
its purported ability to transcend factionalism, as it federalized 
great patches of regulatory authority, often for the cheapest sym­
bolic reasons, that had previously been left to the states. 
Many of the books reviewed in this volume reflect the growing 
skepticism of scholars not only with judicial policymaking but also 
with policymaking by the political branches and the people them­
selves. To take just a small sample, libertarians such as Richard 
Epstein, in Principles for a Free Society, 3 Randy E. Barnett, in The 
Structure of Liberty,4 and Peter W. Huber, in Law and Disorder in 
Cyberspace, 5 explore the ways that common law baselines may reg­
ulate social and economic behavior more effectively and fairly than 
statutory or administrative law. Other scholars, such as James B. 
Jacobs and Kimberly Potter, focus on the unanticipated effects of 
laws that create new federal crimes; in Hate Crimes: Criminal Law 
& Identity Politics, Jacobs and Potter argue cogently that in addition 
to threatening First Amendment values, federal hate crimes laws 
are often violated by the groups they were designed to protect and 
may inflame prejudice rather than eradicate it.6 
Even the popular initiative process, embraced during the Pro­
gressive era as the purest expression of direct democracy, is now 
being questioned for its undeliberative quality. In Lawmaking by 
3. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, PRINCIPLES FOR A FREE SOCIETY (1998). 
4. RANDY E. BARNETI, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY (1998). 
5. PETER W. HUBER, LAW AND DISORDER IN CYBERSPACE (1997). 
6. JAMES B. JACOBS & KIMBERLY POTTER, HA1E CRIMES: CRIMINAL LAW & IDENTITY 
POLITICS (1998). 
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I_nitiative: Issues, Options and Comparisons, 7 by Phillip L. Dubois 
and Floyd Feeney, and Paradise Lost: California's Experience, 
America's Future, 8 by Peter Schrag, the authors examine the polit­
ical process failures that, in their view, make initiatives in the 1990s 
poor barometers of popular will: voters often do not understand 
deceptively drafted, overly complicated ballot questions; profes­
sional signature collectors are more concerned with efficiency than 
measuring the breadth or depth of voter preferences; low turnout 
makes initiatives vulnerable to capture by special interests; and 
piecemeal decisionmaking entrenches shortsighted policy choices. 
In a vivid illustration of these problems, William G. Bowen and 
Derek Bok, in The Shape of the River, note that some supporters of 
Proposition 209 in California had second thoughts after the Univer­
sity of California responded to the anti-affirmative action initiative 
in ways that they hadn't anticipated. In particular, the supporters 
were troubled by the impulse to maintain racial diversity without 
racial preferences by redefining the central mission of the research 
university in a way that lowers standards for all students.9 
The new skepticism about the unanticipated effects of judicial 
and legislative policymaking seems to be reflected in a turning away 
from grand theory and toward empirical analysis. In Judicial Policy 
Making in the Modem State: How the Courts Reformed America's 
Prisons, 10 Malcolm M. Feeley and Edward L. Rubin insist that judi­
cial policymaking is a separate enterprise from judicial interpreta­
tion, and they use the prison reform litigation cases of the 1960s and 
1970s to offer a sociological description of what, precisely, judicial 
policymaking involves: how judges created legislative rules for gov­
erning America's prisons; how their choices were constrained by 
moral and political background norms; how successfully the rules 
were implemented; and how the perceived success of the reform 
movement in replacing torture with efficiency has put new social 
pressures on prisons that they are, in many respects, ill-equipped to 
bear. In her review of Feeley and Rubin's book, Margo Schlanger 
suggests that scholars might cast further light on the subject by 
7. PHILIP L. DUBOIS & FLOYD FEENEY, LAWMAKING BY lNmATIVE: lssUES, OPTIONS 
AND COMPARISONS (1998). 
8. PETER SCHRAG, PARADISE Losr. CALIFORNIA'S EXPERIENCE, .AMERICA'S FUTURE 
(1998). 
9. WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RrvER: LoNG-TERM 
CONSEQUENCES OF CoNSIDERING RACE IN CoLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS 288 
(1998). 
10. MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING IN THE 
MODERN STATE: How THE COURTS REFORMED AMERicA's PRISONS (1998). 
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moving even closer to the ground: in addition to asking how judges 
make policy, she suggests, scholars of judicial policymaking should 
also ask how courts function as an arena of policy disputation by 
examining the realities of litigation, including pretrial settlements 
and the strategic incentives of counsel, that shape constitutional 
outcomes at least as dramatically as judges do. In an age when top­
down theorizing is increasingly unfashionable, bottom-up empirical 
analysis seems increasingly appealing. 
Perhaps the most revealing indication of the pragmatic temper 
of legal scholarship today is the growing impatience with constitu­
tional theory even among constitutional theorists themselves. And 
in this regard, no book published this year is more representative 
than Cass Sunstein's One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on 
the Supreme Court.11 With his new book, Sunstein has joined a dis­
tinguished line of liberal constitutional theorists who have defended 
the democratic value of judicial modesty. Although some of his 
earlier work had embraced less diffident visions of constitutional 
interpretation, he now places himself squarely in the tradition of 
Felix Frankfurter and his disciple, Alexander Bickel, who famously 
advocated the "passive virtues" of declining to decide cases in cer­
tain circumstances so as to promote democratic debate. Sunstein's 
prescription is more comprehensive than Bickel's, which makes it 
uniquely well-suited to an age that has lost its constitutional faith. 
Like the Unitarian who believes that there is at most one God, 
Sunstein urges the Supreme Court to be self-mortifying about the 
limits of its knowledge. It should refuse to decide certain cases and 
agree to decide other cases as narrowly as possible, so as to pre­
serve spaces for contested issues to be debated democratically. But 
Sunstein's interpretive approach, which he calls "judicial minimal­
ism," is not a recipe for deference to the people and their represent­
atives in all circumstances. Although minimalists "disfavor broad 
rules that would draw a wide range of democratically enacted legis­
lation into question," Sunstein writes, they "are not committed to 
majority rule in all contexts. Majoritarianism is itself a form of 
maximalism."12 Sunstein argues for a jurisprudence of mixed re­
sults, counseling courts to strike down laws in some circumstances 
and to uphold them in others, but always to be guided by what he 
calls "democracy-promoting minimalism."13 
11. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME 
COURT (1999). 
12. Id. at x. 
13. Id. at 24. 
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It is rare that a work of constitutional theory so enthusiastically 
celebrates, and so precisely expresses, the mood of a particular 
Supreme Court. For nearly forty years, politicians and legal schol­
ars have focused on different responses to the perceived overexpan­
siveness and lack of humility that characterized the decisions of the 
Warren Court. The great constitutional theorists of the previous 
generation, from Bickel to John Hart Ely, displayed a critical tone 
toward the Justices of their era that combined theoretical dismay 
with barely concealed contempt. Sunstein, by contrast, is Whiggish 
in every way. He has warm praise for "[s]everal of the justices, 
most notably O'Connor (but also Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Ste­
vens, and Souter), [who] are cautious about broad rulings and ambi­
tious pronouncements. Usually, they like to decide cases on the 
narrowest possible grounds. "14 Sunstein contrasts these heroes 
with the villains of his story, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices 
Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, who "think that it is impor­
tant for the Court to lay down clear, bright-line rules, producing 
stability and clarity in the law."15 No other scholar has captured the 
temper of the current majority as neatly as Sunstein, nor has any­
one else attempted to provide a theoretical justification for what 
other observers took to be ad-hockery or improvisation. For these 
reasons Sunstein's book deserves close attention. 
Sunstein wants to reformulate the terms of constitutional debate 
by focusing on minimalism and maximalism, rather than activism 
and restraint. "Judicial restraint" is a notoriously imprecise term -
it can include a range of deferential judicial behavior, from defer­
ence to legislatures to deference to constitutional text or history or 
precedent, all of which may point in very different directions. The 
Justices that Sunstein criticizes, as well as those that he praises, 
have identified themselves, at various times, as acolytes of judicial 
restraint; but it is hard to consider the Rehnquist Court, as a whole, 
to be a restrained Court. Although it is less willing than its prede­
cessors to create and to expand broad rights of personal autonomy 
- as demonstrated by its refusal to recognize a sweeping right to 
die16 - the Rehnquist Court is more willing to strike down federal 
statutes as violations of federalism or the separation of powers. (In 
1997 alone, it struck down four federal laws17; and in more recent 
14. Id. at xiii. 
15. Id. 
16. See Washington v. Glucksbei:g, 521 U. S. 702 (1997); see also Vacco v. Quill, 521 U. S. 
793 (1997). 
17. See Printz v. United States, 521 U. S. 898 (1997) (invalidating part of the Brady Hand­
gun Violence Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993)); Reno v. ACLU, 521 
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cases, like Clinton v. City of New York,18 invalidating the line item 
veto, its attitude toward Congress can only be described as cava­
lier.) Sunstein recognizes that the most distinctive quality of the 
Rehnquist Court is not its commitment to restraint but its aversion 
to ambitious theorizing, its preference for saying as little as possi­
ble, its instinct for consensus rather than confrontation (a surprising 
number of important opinions are unanimous), and its proclivity for 
handing down bold rulings without bothering to agree on very deep 
reasoning to explain its decisions. 
Is this aversion to reason-giving something to be celebrated, as 
Sunstein suggests, or is it a form of judicial self-aggrandizement 
masquerading as modesty? Sunstein models his theory on what 
Bickel called the "passive virtues," which Bickel defined as the use 
of judicial avoidance techniques to delay decisions in important 
cases that might be further clarified by democratic debate.19 How­
ever, for the Justices to extend Bickel's notion of "passive virtues" 
to a judicial opinion itself, refusing to say what they think about a 
constitutional issue after they have promised to do so, is a pecu­
liarly coy vision of the judicial role. It seems not so much passive as 
passive-aggressive. 
The most fundamental characteristic of judicial minimalism, as 
Sunstein defines it, is a commitment to leaving important questions 
unresolved. He argues persuasively that the most effective judicial 
decisions are those that preempt democratic deliberation as little as 
possible. But it is hard to see how citizens can deliberate meaning­
fully about constitutional issues when the Court refuses to share its 
own views about the rules of debate. 
Encouraging judges to preserve space for democratic delibera­
tion, Sunstein provides a series of distinctions. First, minimalist de­
cisions should be narrow rather than broad - 'that is, minimalist 
Justices should try to decide the case at hand without laying down a 
sweeping rule that will bind lower courts and legislatures in similar 
cases.20 Second, minimalist decisions should be shallow rather than 
deep - they should lay down a rule in the case at hand without 
U.S. 844 (1997) (invalidating part of the Communications Decency Act, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 
110 Stat. 133 (1996)); City ofBoeme v. Flores, 521U.S.507 (1997) (invalidating the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488); Babbit v. Youppe, 
519 U.S. 234 (1997) (invalidating an amendment of the Indian Land Consolidation Act of 
1984, Pub. L. No. 97-459, 96 Stat. 2515, 2517-19 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2201-
2211 (1994))). 
18. 524 U.S. 417 (1998). 
19. See Al.ExANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1965). 
20. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 10-11. 
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giving an ambitious theoretical account of their reasons for doing 
so. By avoiding foundational questions, and converging on "incom­
pletely theorized arguments, courts can make it unnecessary for 
people to agree when agreement is impossible."21 But Sunstein is 
not a maximalist when it comes to minimalism. Courts should feel 
free to issue wide and deep decisions, and to speak in the oracular 
mode, he argues, when they have great confidence in the constitu­
tional merits of a case, or when they have debated an issue incre­
mentally over time and are prepared to converge around an 
ambitious solution. Alternatively, a broad and deep opinion can 
reduce uncertainty or "promote democratic goals either by creating 
preconditions for democracy or by imposing good incentives on 
elected officials."22 In ordinary circumstances, however, when 
judges are proceeding in the face of uncertainty or rapidly changing 
circumstances, or when the preconditions for democratic self-gov­
ernment are not at stake, or when "the need for advance planning 
does not seem insistent,"23 narrow and shallow decisions are what 
Sunstein recommends. 
Sunstein's matrix of categories is certainly provocative, but it 
seems just as malleable as the categories of activism and restraint 
that it wishes to usurp. Whether a decision is characterized as nar­
row or shallow, or deep or broad, seems entirely in the eye of the 
beholder. Sunstein lists Brown v. Board of Education as an exam­
ple of a wide and deep opinion,24 but it might just as well be seen as 
a narrow and shallow one. After all, the Court declared segrega­
tion in public schools unconstitutional without explaining very 
clearly why it was doing so, and without saying anything about the 
constitutionality of different forms of state-sponsored segregation 
(on public transportation, for example). As Neil Devins also notes 
in his review of the book, the indeterminacy of Sunstein's catego­
ries calls their broader utility into question. Moreover, because 
Sunstein focuses almost entirely on the jurisprudence of the Rehn­
quist Court, and doesn't tell us what he thinks about many other 
landmarks of the Warren era, it is hard to say whether his theory is 
tailor-made for a particular group of Justices, or whether it has a 
more general application. 
If the Supreme Court were the only court in the nation, it might 
be able to embrace a highly personalized, "the law is what we say it 
21. Id. at 14. 
22. Id. at 57. 
23. Id. 
24. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see SUNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 17 tbl.1.1. 
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is" jurisprudence, without worrying about giving very clear reasons 
for why it is doing so, and without tipping its hand about how it is 
likely to decide similar cases in the future. In the American system, 
however, the Supreme Court sits at the top of a pyramid of inferior 
federal courts, all of which are bound to apply its decisions uni­
formly throughout the nation. When faced with a narrow, shallow 
Supreme Court decision of the kind that Sunstein praises, lower 
courts may literally be at a loss about what the opinion means. This 
is more likely to promote chaos than reasoned deliberation. Sun­
stein acknowledges that minimalism may shift the burden of mak­
ing hard decisions from the Supreme Court to lower courts.25 For 
this reason, he stresses that when "planning" by lower courts and 
citizens is important, minimalism may be inappropriate. 
But isn't "planning" important in every case that the Supreme 
Court agrees to hear? In an age in which the Supreme Court is 
deciding fewer and fewer cases, and selecting the handful of cases 
that it agrees to hear by looking for areas of disagreements among 
the lower courts, it seems inefficient and even irresponsible for the 
Justices to refuse to lay down clear rules in the few cases in which 
they have promised to do so. Surely it is hard to argue that the 
legal questions in these cases would benefit from further debate in 
the lower courts, since it was the existence of vigorous disagree­
ment in ihe lower courts that led the Supreme Court to agree to 
hear the case in the first place. When the Supreme Court issues 
terse, elliptical opinions in which the reasoning is hard to discern, it 
compounds the confusion of inferior courts in precisely those cases 
in which the relevant actors are pleading for a clear resolution. The 
result is a national exercise in clairvoyance as lower courts and leg­
islatures spend great energy and expense trying to puzzle through 
problems that the Supreme Court promised but then refused to 
resolve. 
Because Sunstein presents no empirical evidence about the de­
gree to which legislatures or citizens may respond differently to 
shallow as opposed to deep decisions, it is hard to say with confi­
dence whether or not an opaque or shallow opinion can, in fact, 
provoke more democratic deliberation than a deep one can. Since 
the subset of lawyers who regularly read Supreme Court opinions 
after they have graduated from law school is tiny, and the subset of 
non-lawyers who read Supreme Court opinions is far smaller, it is 
25. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 48 ("A court that economizes on decision costs for 
itself may in the process 'export' decision costs to other people, including litigants and judges 
in subsequent cases who must give content to the law."). 
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possible that the shallowness or depth of an opinion has little influ­
ence on the degree to which it influences political debate. (Most 
citizens get their knowledge of Supreme Court opinions from tele­
vision, which suggests that Sunstein's central premise that the 
courts can participate in an informed dialogue with citizens may be 
idealistic.) Yet shallow opinions seem especially unlikely to pro­
voke reasoned deliberation, because they give citizens and legisla­
tors so little to deliberate about, except to try to predict the future 
votes of the Justices who produced them. 
Sunstein recognizes the democratic virtues of deep opinions as 
opposed to shallow ones: they help to promote the rule of law, he 
notes, by limiting judicial discretion and improving predictability. 
But he defends shallow decisions nevertheless, on the grounds that 
they permit citizens with "diverse theoretical commitments" to con­
verge around outcomes when they are unable to converge around 
abstract principles. The voting rights experiment, however, calls 
even that modest claim into question: an incompletely theorized 
case like Shaw v. Reno26 gives citizens no basis for knowing what, 
precisely, they are being asked to accept in redistricting rulings, be­
yond the unsatisfying claim that a voting district is unconstitutional 
if the swing vote, Justice O'Connor, thinks it is. 
By embracing shallowness as a judicial virtue, Sunstein is advo­
cating a version of the personalized jurisprudence of Justice 
O'Connor; but in this area, instead of promoting reasoned delibera­
tion, O'Connor's minimalism entangles individual Justices in the 
political process to the most minute and confusing degree. Because 
O'Connor has not explicated the rules or standards that, in her 
view, distinguish constitutional from unconstitutional districts, the 
process of redistricting in the wake of the 1990 census has largely 
become an exercise in reading Justice O'Connor's mind. Justice 
Stewart's famous test for obscenity - "I know it when I see it" -
was based on the conviction that there was a social consensus about 
what is obscene, but that it reflected too m:any legal and moral per­
mutations to be captured in a single judicial rule. Justice 
O'Connor's focus on "oddly shaped districts," by contrast, seems to 
rest on no broader aesthetic than the sensibility of O'Connor 
herself. 
In a powerful article called Judges as Advicegivers, Neal Kumar 
Katyal argues that the best way for courts to achieve Sunstein's goal 
- avoiding interference with the political branches and encourag-
26. 509 U.S. 630 (1993). 
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ing settlement of constitutional issues politically rather than judi­
cially - is to write narrow but deep opinions. That is, opinions 
explaining their carefully confined holdings with a generous reli­
ance upon dicta, or nonbinding advice, that provide clear guidance 
to legislators and citizens about the rationale and assumptions be­
hind a decision.27 The narrowness of the holding would ensure that 
democratic prerogatives are preserved across a range of issues, and 
the clear advice would permit the political branches to make in­
formed decisions about the constitutional limits on their powers, 
rather than trying to read judicial tea leaves. For example, Katya! 
argues, about Clinton v. Jones,28 that the Court could have written a 
narrow opinion siding with Jones, rather than a hyperbolic opinion 
declaring that text and history provide "no substantial support" for 
claims of presidential immunity. After acknowledging the closeness 
and uncertainty of the question, the Court could have declined to 
create the presidential immunity that Clinton requested, on the 
grounds that a constitutional solution to the problem would freeze 
the matter permanently. But the opinion could have included clari­
fying dicta, informing Congress about the potential constitutional 
problems, and strongly suggesting that a legislative grant of immu­
nity would be the most appropriate way to address them.29 
With characteristic fairmindedness, Sunstein acknowledges the 
arguments for judicial depth. By refusing to give intelligible rea­
sons for their decisions, he notes, Justices run the risk that litigants 
in similar cases will not receive equal treatment by lower courts. 
The main objection that he raises to a deep decision is that "judges 
may not be good at ambitious theorizing, and may hence blunder -
a special problem when they are invalidating legislation."30 Still, it 
is not clear that judges are any better at less ambitious theorizing, 
which may require a subtlety and complexity that more abstract ar­
guments often do not require. 
Deep opinions may be as likely to preempt democracy as shal­
low ones are, although for different reasons. This is a wrinkle that 
Sunstein's analysis is perfectly able to accommodate: he argues 
convincingly that the case for shallowness or depth may vary de­
pending on the context in which a particular constitutional issue is 
being debated in the democratic sphere. A more fundamental criti­
cism of judicial minimalism is that, when push comes to shove, 
27. See Neal Kumar Katya!, Judges as Advicegivers, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1709, 1711 (1998). 
28. 520 U. S. 681 (1997). 
29. See Katya!, supra note 27, at 1757-59. 
30. SUNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 244. 
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Sunstein does not really trust democracy at all. He is committed to 
deliberation in the abstract, but he is willing to override the judg­
ment of the actual citizens in actual debates when they don't coin­
cide with his own intuitions about what a deliberative democracy 
should embrace. Democracy, Sunstein stresses .repeatedly, should 
not be confused with simple majoritarianism; but at times, the out­
comes that Sunstein is willing to credit as genuinely "deliberative," 
as opposed to "naked preferences" supported by "power but not 
reasons,"31 look surprisingly like the outcomes with which Sunstein 
happens to agree. 
Consider affirmative action. "I start with the suggestion that the 
issue of affirmative action should be settled democratically, not ju­
dicially," Sunstein writes.32 He then praises the Supreme Court's 
"meandering course, its refusal to issue rules, its minimalism" in the 
affirmative action cases, which "might be defended as performing a 
valuable catalytic function .... to spur, but not to preempt, effective 
public debate."33 All this is entirely plausible. At the moment, the 
Court is closely divided between two wide, deep, and mutually in­
consistent readings of the constitutional guarantee of equality. 
Four Justices - Scalia, Thomas, Rehnquist, and, a little more tenta­
tively, Kennedy- seem to believe that affirmative action is uncon­
stitutional in nearly all circumstances because the Constitution is 
colorblind. Four Justices - Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer 
- seem committed to the principle that affirmative action is per­
missible in most circumstances because the Constitution prohibits 
only racial classifications that promote racial castes. Sandra Day 
O'Connor has not made up her mind. The Court's inability to mus­
ter five votes for one alternative over the other has resulted in a 
series of fragmented opinions that have indeed, as Sunstein sug­
gests, provoked a useful debate about the permissible scope of af­
firmative action in the public sphere. The affirmative action cases 
show O'Connorism at its most galvanizing: by offering a series of 
narrow and shallow distinctions - affirmative action may be per­
missible in universities but not in federal contacting; diversity is a 
more important goal in the classroom than in federal highway 
projects - the Court has provoked legislators and citizens to de­
bate a complicated topic in sophisticated ways. 
The most important of these debates took place in California, 
and it culminated in Proposition 209 - adopted by the citizens of 
31. See id. at 25. 
32. Id. at 117. 
33. Id. at 117-18. 
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California on November 5, 1996-which says, "[t]he state shall not 
discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to,. any individ­
ual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national 
origin in the operation of public employment, public education or 
public contracting." One would have expected Sunstein to praise 
Proposition 209 as a democratic settlement of our most hotly con­
tested social question. But in a remarkable passage, Sunstein sug­
gests that Proposition 209 may not deserve to be considered 
democratic at all: 
Political processes in California on this issue did not appear to be de­
liberative. The American system is one of representative rather than . 
direct democracy, partly because of a judgment that political delibera­
tion can be best promoted through a representative system. If judicial 
decisions stimulate poorly functioning referendum processes, little 
will be gained.34 
Indeed, Sunstein goes so far as to suggest that the Court might have 
been justified in striking down Proposition 209 as unconstitutional 
on the grounds that it "contained a ban that prevented the kind of 
careful analysis of particulars that has stood behind the Court's own 
decisions,"35 although he later retreats from this suggestion.36 But 
surely the point of minimalism is to allow citizens to converge 
around what they consider to be a deep principle of justice that 
removes some subjects from the judicial realm once and for all; and 
this should include a political resolution of the affirmative action 
debate. 
The notion that Proposition 209 was not sufficiently "delibera­
tive" is especially hard to sustain in light of recent scholarly insights 
about the limits of the initiative process in general. In fact, the de­
bate over Proposition 209, like all political debates, was a messy 
combination of high principle and low politics: it contained appeals 
to clashing principles (its sponsors, two college professors, are ear­
nest proponents of the view that the Constitution should be color­
blind), factual predictions that turned out to be overly optimistic 
(affirmative action opponents didn't anticipate that the political 
pressures to continue to admit minority students to the University 
of California in a post-209 world would result in efforts to lower 
standards for students across the board), as well as some crude ra­
cial appeals. But this is what real debates in real democracies look 
like. And the work of scholars such as Schrag, Feeney, and Dubois 
34. Id. at 133. 
35. Id. at 135. 
36. Id. 
May 1999] Foreword 1335 
suggests that the debate over Proposition 209 may have been a 
more accurate reflection of the depth and intensity of popular senti­
ment about affirmative action than many of the more obscure ini­
tiatives that are brought before the distracted electorate. 
If the impeachment of Bill Clinton accomplished anything, 
surely it should have weaned constitutional theorists of the 
Panglosssian ideal of democratic deliberation in America as a so­
ber, cool, ratiocinative exercise in achieving consensus through rea­
son-giving. In this diverse and truculent country, there are fierce 
and irreconcilable differences of opinion about the moral and polit­
ical and cultural battles that ultimately culminated in the Clinton 
impeachment. To imagine that these philosophical disagreements 
can be overcome by earnest legislators and citizens persuading each 
other through reasoned argument will strike anyone who lived 
through the past year as fanciful; and it displays an abstracted ideal­
ization of the process of politics over its substance. Indeed, if there 
was any poetic justice in the impeachment, it was to display the 
shallowness of the Clintonian ideal of national conversation as a 
cure for all political ills. At the same time, the President's acquittal 
reminded us of the rough wisdom of a constitution founded on pop­
ular sovereignty: public opinion about Clinton's transgressions per­
sistently showed more nuance and maturity than the partisanship 
and the sanctimony that dominated public debate in the media, in 
Congress, in the White House, and even in the courts. An unsenti­
mental assessment of the limits of political deliberation, in other 
words, isn't an argument against American constitutionalism. It is 
an argument for American constitutionalism. There are some con­
versations that are pointless to prolong. At some point, everybody 
has to shut up and vote. 
The events of the past year also reminded us about the constitu­
tional costs of encouraging Supreme Court Justices to reduce them­
selves to plumbers and tinkerers. The legal forces that culminated 
in the Clinton impeachment - in particular, the erosion of privacy 
law, embodied in Fourth and Fifth Amendment protections for in­
dividual control over personal information; and the expansion of 
sexual harassment law, to a point where people can be interrogated 
about the details of their consensual relationships on the flimsiest of 
allegations - are the product of surprisingly recent decisions by the 
Supreme Court. They took place during the three decades from the 
beginning of the 1970s to the end of the 1990s when the Justices, 
stung by allegations of activism during the Warren years - self­
consciously began to shun the grand style, and to write minimalist 
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opnnons that handed down results without bothering to justify 
them with coherent reasons. As a result, fundamental constitu­
tional protections were diluted or even abandoned, more out of 
carelessness than constitutional principle. It was during the 1970s 
and 80s, for example, that the axiom that private diaries couldn't be 
subpoenaed as mere evidence in civil or white-collar criminal cases 
- the paradigmatic example of an unreasonable search and seizure 
for the Framers of the Fourth Amendment - was allowed to wither 
away without anyone acknowledging its slow demise. 
In an effort to avoid the grand style of Warrenism, the 
Rehnquist Court has swung so far in the other direction that legal 
scholars today are feeling a little like the man drinking at the bar on 
the Titanic: "I asked for ice," he says, "but this is ridiculous." What 
has been lost is the basic ingredient of principled decisionmaking, 
which is a commitment to judicial reason-giving. The problem with 
the most notoriously maximalist decisions of the Warren and Bur­
ger Courts - Roe is the paradigm case - was not that they were 
philosophically ambitious; it was that they were overly simplistic 
and thinly reasoned. The minimalist decisions of the Rehnquist 
Court suffer from precisely the same flaw. And so we have the 
spectacle of a Court exercising great power without offering pub­
licly accountable reasons, which seems hard to reconcile with the 
vision of democracy that minimalism was designed to promote. 
In judicial opinions, as in democracy, there are different ways of 
achieving consensus. One is to offer as few reasons as possible, so 
no one can possibly feel slighted. Another is to offer as many rea­
sons as possible, none of which is dispositive, but each of which, like 
strands in a rope, binds together to strengthen the whole. A mini­
malist who took seriously the judicial duty of reason-giving might 
recognize that there are, in this pluralistic age, a range of plausible 
interpretive methodologies, and that judicial intervention seems 
most legitimate when it can be justified along as many different 
axes as possib_le. The conventional tools of legal interpretation -
text, history, precedent, tradition, constitutional structure, and 
moral argument - often point in very different directions. A mini­
malist judge who took seriously her responsibility to persuade citi­
zens of "diverse theoretical commitments," as Sunstein puts it, 
might b.e inclined to defer in the face of contestability, and to strike 
down laws only in those rare cases when the different methodologi­
cal tools all point in the same direction. By giving more reasons, 
rather than fewer reasons, a decision to invalidate could be justified 
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in ways that judges and citizens with clashing moral and political 
ru;id constitutional commitments can understand. 
. "[T]ruth . . .  is the legal system's abiding value," Kenneth Starr 
said in a recent speech, comparing himself to Atticus Finch in To 
Kill a Mockingbird.37 In a charming essay in this volume, Steven 
Lubet expresses skepticism about Finch's claims to exemplify abso­
lute truth and asks us to entertain the possibility that Finch's client 
was, in fact, guilty. Lubet's thought experiment reminds us that we 
are living amid the rubble of constitutional fundamentalism, and 
any successful interpretive approach would do well to embrace the 
spirit of humility that Sunstein's book embodies. , But judicial 
humility does not involve an aversion to reason-giving but a passion 
for it. The qualities of a great judicial opinion- transparency, can­
dor in the face of uncertainty, and analytical depth - are precisely 
those qualities that are most conducive to public accountability. 
In light of recent scholarship expressing skepticism about the 
deliberative powers not only of the courts but also of the political 
branches and the people themselves, it seems reckless for judges 
and legal scholars to demand a lower standard of deliberation, re­
flection, reason-giving, and intellectual accountability from the 
Justices of the Supreme Court than they demand from the citizens 
of the United States. At this unexpected moment of legal consen­
sus, as liberals and conservatives are converging around the ideal of 
theoretical humility, perhaps it is time to recover some of the faith 
in judges as reason-givers that we have spent the past forty years 
trying to overcome. I do not mean faith in the over-confident, 
democracy-thwarting opinions of the Warren era. I mean faith in 
the ability of chastened judges to justify their restrained decisions 
with intelligible, publicly accessible, well-reasoned and at times 
even deep arguments, that provide clear guidance to citizens and 
legislators. Thanks largely to the transformation of legal culture 
that the reaction to Warrenism helped to precipitate, the federal 
bench in general, and the Supreme Court in particular, is now com­
posed of an able group of Democrats and Republicans, whose simi­
larities are more notable than their differences, and who agree 
more often than they disagree about what distinguishes good legal 
arguments from bad ones. It is indeed passive-aggressive for this 
Court to hoard its enhanced authority by retreating into an ellipti­
cal and obscurantist unanimity. The philosophical silence of the 
37. See Kenneth Starr, Whitewater Independent Counsel, Remarks at Mecklenberg Bar 
Foundation, Charlotte, North Carolina (June 1, 1998) (transcribed by the Federal News 
Service). 
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Supreme Court is an antidemocratic silence. Have we all been so 
spooked by the ghost of Warrenism that we have inadvertently re­
vived it in a different form? 
